Legislation: Child Abduction by a Relative: Maryland Enacts a Misdemeanor Offense to Deter Parental Child-Stealing by Martin, Allan L.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 8
Issue 3 Spring 1979 Article 10
1979
Legislation: Child Abduction by a Relative:
Maryland Enacts a Misdemeanor Offense to Deter
Parental Child-Stealing
Allan L. Martin
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martin, Allan L. (1979) "Legislation: Child Abduction by a Relative: Maryland Enacts a Misdemeanor Offense to Deter Parental
Child-Stealing," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 3, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol8/iss3/10
LEGISLATION 
CHILD ABDUCTION BY A RELATIVE: MARYLAND 
ENACTS A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE TO 
DETER PARENTAL CHILD-STEALING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An equity court decrees that one parent to a divorce proceeding 
shall be the lawful custodian of the children. Displeased with the 
arrangement, the non-custodial parent takes the children and moves 
to another state. Absent extraordinary circumstances indicating 
that the act was committed to protect the safety or welfare of the 
children, the authority of the court decree presumably should invoke 
some legal process to effect an immediate return of the children to 
their lawful custodian. Unfortunately, courts and law enforcement 
personnel have been ill-equipped to effectuate an immediate return of 
parentally abducted children, which has led to a seriously high 
incidence of parental child abductions. 
For instance, one Maryland mother was awarded legal custody 
in seven different states, but de facto custody remained with the 
father who abducted the child following each custody award. l 
Furthermore~ a recent study indicates that as many as 100,000 
children are abducted or detained by parents each year.2 In 1978, the 
Maryland General Assembly reacted to this problem3 by enacting a 
misdemeanor statute proscribing parental child abductions.4 This 
article will analyze this legislation after reviewing the legal 
problems which led to its enactment. 
II. THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 
A. The Civil Law 
A lawful custodian has two civil courses of action to follow in 
attempting to regain actual custody of a parentally abducted child. 
1. Mouat, When Parents Kidnap Their Own Children, The Christian Science 
Monitor, Jan. 4, 1979, at 17, col. 1. 
2. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and 
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifica· 
tions, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 978, 979 n.5 (1977). 
3. Maryland's first legislative step occurred in 1975 with the adoption of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 
(Supp. 1978). This legislation was designed to remedy the civil side of the 
problem but included no criminal sanctions. See text accompanying notes 31-35 
infra. 
4. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 435, 1978 Md. Laws 1581 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 2A (Supp. 1978». Although this article concentrates on the problems 
associated with the taking of a child out-of-state by the non-custodial parent, the 
new statute also applies to in-state abductions. In fact, if law enforcement 
personnel can use the law to apprehend abducting parents while they are in the 
state, the major problems in this area would be solved. 
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First, he may institute a constructive,5 civil6 contempt proceeding in 
the court that rendered the custody decree. 7 Second, if the child has 
been removed to another state, the lawful custodian generally must 
institute habeas corpus proceedings in that state in order to obtain 
the child's return.S 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the taking of a 
child in violation of a custody decree constitutes actionable 
constructive, civil contempt.9 Maryland Rule P4 provides that a 
lawful custodian may petition the court that rendered the custody 
decree for a contempt order.lO The court must then issue a show 
cause orderll and serve it upon the abducting parent pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 104.12 If the abducting parent fails to answer the 
charge, the case may be heard ex parte.13 Once an abducting parent 
is held in contempt of court for violating the custody decree, a court 
may issue a bench warrant or writ of attachment directing a sheriff 
to take the abducting parent into custody until the contempt is 
purged by returning the child to the lawful custodian.14 
5. Con tempts are classified as to the place of their commission: a direct contempt is 
"committed in the presence of the court, or so near to the court as to interrupt its 
proceedings," Md. Rule PI a; whereas a constructive contempt is committed out 
of the presence of the court. Md. Rule PI b. See generally 17 C.J .S. Contempt §§ 3, 
4 (1963). 
6. Con tempts are also classified as civil or criminal. Civil contempt proceedings are 
brought to preserve the rights of private parties and to aid in the enforcement of 
the court's decree, State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 728, 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973); 
whereas criminal contempt proceedings vindicate the dignity and authority of 
the court and the state is generally the prosecutor. Id. at 727, 298 A.2d at 875. A 
civil contempt need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence and, 
because it is remedial in nature, it must provide that the defendant may purge 
himself. Id. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876. A criminal contempt must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and because it is intended to punish for past misconduct, it 
may be purely punitive without provision for purging. Id. 
The determination of whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal can 
be difficult. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has delineated five factors which 
generally point to a civil contempt: 
(1) the complainant is usually a private person as opposed to the State; 
(2) the contempt proceeding is entitled in the original action and filed as 
a continuation thereof as opposed to a separate and independent action; 
(3) holding the defendant in contempt affords relief to a private party; (4) 
the relief requested is primarily for the benefit of the complainant; (5) the 
acts complained of do not of themselves constitute crimes or conduct by 
the defendant so wilful or contumelious that the court is impelled to act 
on its own motion. 
Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 317, 226 A.2d 304, 307 (1967). 
7. See text accompanying notes 9-14 infra. 
8. See 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habeas Corpus § 99 (1968); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 124 
(1976). See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 infra. 
9. Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 226 A.2d 304 (1967). 
10. Md. Rule P4(a). 
11. Id. at P4(b)(1)(a). 
12. Id. at P4(b)(1)(c). 
13. Id. at P4(c). 
14. Cf. In re Lee, 170 Md. 43,53, 183 A. 560, 564, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680 (1936) ("If, 
on the other hand, the accused does not, by his answer, fully deny or justify the 
acts charged against him, he may be fined and imprisoned, or such terms 
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A contempt proceeding may be futile, however, where the 
abducting parent has fled the state. IS Although an abducting parent 
who submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in the original custody 
proceeding cannot defeat the court's jurisdiction over the child 
custody matter for purposes of issuing orders to aid in the 
enforcement of its decree,16 leaving the state will negate any 
practical effect to the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction because the 
court's process does not run beyond the territorial limits of the 
state.17 Some courts, in fact, may decline to act on the theory that 
"the court will not do a futile thing"IB when it appears that the 
abducting parent has left the state and is unlikely to return. 
Absent criminal process, habeas corpus proceedings may be the 
only means, other than self-help, to obtain custody of an abducted 
child who is removed to another state. Locating the child and 
applying to the foreign state for habeas corpus, however, does not 
guarantee return of the child. First, abducting parents have 
contested the custody issue in habeas corpus proceedings and have 
been awarded legal custody.19 Second, even ifthe court rules in favor 
of the petitioning parent, the abducting parent may remove the child 
to yet another state. 
The problematic results of those cases that have awarded 
custody to an abducting parent raise the issues of jurisdiction, full 
faith and credit, and res judicata. The resolution of these issues has 
worked, at times, to the detriment of the original lawful custodian, 
and unfortunately has promoted parental child-stealing, forum-
shopping, and relitigation of the custody issue in other states.20 
imposed upon him as the justice of the case may require."); Hare v. Hare, 21 Md. 
App. 71, 75, 318 A2d 234, 236 (1974) (abducting parent's confinement should 
have been terminated once the children were returned to the custodial parent 
because the contempt was purged). 
15. Ct. Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 226 A2d 304 (1967) (abducting parent who 
removed children out-of·state is immune from service of process, which includes a 
writ of attachment directing a sheriff to take the parent into custody until the 
contempt is purged, while attending and participating in an unrelated action in 
the state). The futility of civil contempt proceedings in this type of case and the 
need for criminal penalties to invoke criminal process has long been recognized. 
See, e.g., Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023, 1025 (1912). 
16. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (1913); Policastro v. Policastro, 
5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2427, 2428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). See generally Rheinstein, 
The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1955). 
Compliance with Maryland Rules P4 and 104, however, constitutes due process 
of law in the prosecution of constructive contempts. Reamer v. Reamer, 246 Md. 
532, 229 A2d 74 (1967). 
17. See note 15 supra. 
18. Pelz v; Pelz, 182 AD. 923, 169 N.Y.S. 430 (1918). 
19. See, e.g., In re Wise, 14 Ariz. App. 125, 481 P.2d 296 (1971); Wagner v. Torrence, 
94 Colo. 47, 27 P.2d 1038 (1933); Brown v. Walls, 38 Ill. App. 2d 385, 187 N.E.2d 
288 (1962); White v. White, 214 Ind. 405, 15 N.E.2d 86 (1938); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 
88 N.H. 223, 186 A 1 (1936); Sprague v. Bucher, 38 Tenn. App. 40, 270 S.W.2d 565 
(1953). 
20. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 194-98 (1971) 
[hereafter cited as WEINTRAUB]. 
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The modem rule recognizes three bases of jurisdiction in child 
custody cases: the state of the child's domicile, the state where the 
child is physically present (the parens patriae approach), and the 
state that has personal jurisdiction over those contesting the custody 
issue (normally the parents).21 As a result, two or more states may 
have concurrent jurisdiction to grant, deny, or modify a child 
custody award.22 The abducting parent, therefore, may shop around 
for another forum in which to relitigate the custody issue. 
A sister state, furthermore, is not required to afford full faith and 
credit to the original custody decree. 23 Although the United States 
Supreme Court has avoided the issue whether the full faith and 
credit clause applies to child custody decrees,24 the Court has held 
that a custody decree which is subject to modification by the court 
which rendered it may be modified by a sister state court.25 In 
Maryland, as in all jurisdictions,26 a child custody decree is based on 
existing circumstances and is subject to modification on a showing 
of changed circumstances.27 As a result, courts generally have held 
that the facts upon which a custody award is based are res judicata 
and cannot be re-examined by another state court; but, a later court 
may examine any facts that have occurred since the original decree 
and modify the decree when in the best interests of the child.28 
The net result is that time is a crucial factor operating against 
the searching parent. The longer the abducting parent can retain de 
facto custody of the child, the stronger the case that changed 
circumstances require that legal custody be changed for the best 
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1969). Prior to the late 
1940's, the assumption was that one state must have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the child. ·The general rule was that the domicile of the child was the only 
jurisdictional basis for a child custody order. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF 
LAws § 117 (1934); WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, at 194. However, non-domiciliary 
states exercised jurisdiction as parens patriae when the child was physically 
present in the state. See, e.g., Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 29 P.2d 206 
(1934); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930). 
22. See, e.g., Perry v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cty., 7 Cal. App. 3d 236, 240,86 
Cal. Rptr. 607,609 (1970); Sami v. Sami, 29 Md. App. 161, 175, 347 A.2d 888, 896 
(1975); Potter v. Rosas, 111 N.H. 169, 171, 276 A.2d 922, 923 (19 .-~;; ~EINTRAUB, 
supra note 20, at 194-96. 
23. See, e.g., Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 52, 27 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1933); 
WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, at 196-97. 
24. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1957); May 
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). 
25. Halvey v. Halvey, 230 U.S. 610 (1947). 
26. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, at 197. 
27. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602(a)(5) (Supp. 1978). See Schwartz v. 
Schwartz, 26 Md. App. 427, 431, 338 A.2d 386, 388-89 (1975). 
28. See, e.g., Perry v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cty., 7 Cal. App. 3d 236, 240, 86 
Cal. Rptr. 607, 609 (1970); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 948, 96 P.2d 849, 850 
(1940); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Griffin v. 
Griffin, 95 Or. 78, 83, 187 P. 598, 601 (1920); In re Saucido, 85 Wash. 2d 653, 657, 
538 P.2d 1219. 1222 (1975). 
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interests of the child.29 Conversely, the viability of civil relief for the 
victimized parent declines as the length of time required to locate the 
child increases. Eventually, self-help may become the only possible 
method of regaining actual custody, precipitating an unstable tug-of-
war environment for the child. 
The Maryland General Assembly initially responded to the 
problem in 1975 by adopting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act.30 A major concern of the Act is the deterrence of parental child-
stealing and .the elimination of forum-shopping and repeated 
litigation over the custody issue.31 The Act is designed to: (1) codify 
the concept that one state should have exclusive jurisdiction over the 
child,32 thereby avoiding multiple jurisdiction conflicts, (2) counter-
act judicial decisions denying full faith and credit to custody decrees 
by "facilitat[ing] the enforcement of custody decrees of other 
states,"33 and (3) deny the abducting parent a court in which to 
relitigate the custody issue,34 thereby avoiding forum-shopping by 
the abducting parent. 
Maryland's adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act cannot in itself eliminate the problem of parental child 
abductions.3s Even in cases where the courts have rigidly applied 
full faith and credit and attempted to enforce child custody decrees, 
which, in effect, conforms to the dictates of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, non-custodial parents have retained de 
facto custody by removing the child to yet another state or another 
29. Compare In re Wise, 14 Ariz. App. 125, 481 P.2d 296 (1971) (change of custody to 
abducting father upheld notwithstanding unlawful taking from another state -
five and one-half year period had elapsed and psychiatric evidence indicated that 
custody by the abducting father would be in the best interests of the child) with 
Deatrick v. Galligan, 18 Ariz. App. 171, 500 P.2d 1159 (1972) (temporary custody 
award to abducting father reversed - mother brought habeas corpus proceeding 
immediately and court held to have exceeded its jurisdiction in making custody 
award). 
30. Law of April 22, 1975, ch. 265, 1975 Md. Laws 1338 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Supp. 1978)). 
31. Id. § 184(a)(1), (a)(4Ha)(7). 
32. Id. §§ 186, 188. 
33. Id. §§ 184(a)(7), 195, 197. 
34. Id. § 190. 
35. To date, only 31 states have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act. See [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2454 (noting that North Carolina and 
Virginia adopted the Act); [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2435 (noting that 
Arkansas adopted the Act); [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2592 (listing the 
following states as having adopted the Act: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming); [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2610 (noting that Kansas and 
Louisiana adopted the Act). Thus, there are a number of jurisdictions where the 
Act may be avoided. 
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country.36 In addition, many non-custodial parents abduct their 
child with no intention of relitigating the question of custody. A 
recent article indicates that these parents have become "so adept at 
hiding and covering all traces that nationally only about 10 percent 
of all such children are found again."37 
Employing the use of law enforcement personnel to track, 
extradite and deter this unlawful conduct appears mandated. The 
Maryland General Assembly and other state legislatures have 
attempted to solve the problem by enacting criminal statutes 
specifically targeted at parental child abductions.3s As indicated in 
one commentary, a chief objective of the child abduction offense is 
to encourage the child's return to the jurisdiction whose contempt 
power can then be used to enforce its custody award.39 
B. The Criminal Law 
The taking, detention, or carrying away of a child by a parent 
against the will of a court-ordered custodian has been defined 
variously as criminal conduct under three related offenses which 
had their origin in the English law.40 False imprisonment and 
kidnapping were common law offenses.4l The third, child-stealing, 
was originally made a crime by Parliament.42 
False imprisonment involves the· unlawful detention or confine-
ment of a person.43 It is a statutory crime in some states;44 but, 
generally, these statutes are merely declaratory of the common 
law.45 In Maryland, false imprisonment is a common law offense.46 
36. C{. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2703 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (child 
unlawfully taken from mother in California by father and removed to New York, 
then Yugoslavia). 
37. Mouat, When Parents Kidnap Their Own Children, The Christian Science 
Monitor, Jan. 4, 1979, at 17, col. 1-2. 
38. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-304 (1973); 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A (Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAw, §§ 135.45, 135.50 
(McKinney 1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 25.03 (Vernon 1974); WYo. STAT. §§ 6-4-203, 6-4-204 (1977). 
39. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 25.03 note (Vernon 1974). 
40. See, e.g., People v. McGinnis, 55 Cal. App. 2d 931, 132 P.2d 30 (1942) (child-
stealing); Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023 (1912) (kidnapping); In re Peck, 
66 Kan. 693, 72 P. 265 (1903) (false imprisonment and kidnapping); State v. 
Farrar, 41 N.H. 53 (1860) (kidnapping). 
41. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *218. 
42. 4 & 5 PHIL. & M., c. 8 (1557). Although child-stealing was not a common law 
crime, the common law did provide a civil action for damages. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *140. The action was in trespass per quod servitium amisit (for 
loss of services) and is still a viable cause of action. See Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 4 
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2703 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
43. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127. 
44. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW, §§ 135.05, 135.10 
(McKinney 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 20.02 (Vernon 1974). 
45. J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, § 102 (1934). 
46. Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 38-39, 139 A.2d 209, 216 (1958). 
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Kidnapping is false imprisonment aggravated by a carrying 
away of the victim to another place.47 All jurisdictions today have 
kidnapping legislation.48 Some jurisdictions, however, have rendered 
their kidnapping statutes inapplicable to cases involving the 
unlawful taking of a child by a parent.49 Maryland did so in 1949.50 
In contrast to false imprisonment and kidnapping, which are 
normally crimes only when committed against the will of the person 
taken,51 the consent, or non-consent, of the child is immaterial in a 
child-stealing prosecution. 52 Child-stealing statutes generally pros-
cribe the taking of a child under a specified age with the intent to 
deprive the parent or lawful custodian of custody. 53 The age used in 
these statutes varies from twelve to eighteen. 54 . 
In 1876, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a child-
stealing statute [hereafter referred to as the 1876 Child Abduction 
Act] that provides criminal sanctions for "[a]ny person who shall 
without the color of right" abduct, take or carry away by force or 
persuasion, or knowingly secrete or harbor any child under the age 
of twelve, or act as an accessory to any of said acts, with the intent 
to deprive the parent or lawful custodian of custody. 55 The Maryland 
appellate courts have never interpreted the "without the color of 
47. Id.; J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, § 103 (1934). The common law required a forcible 
taking and a carrying out of the country. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*219. American statutes expanded coverage of the offense to include fraudulent 
takings and a carrying within or without the state. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 337 (1976). 
48. Note, A Rationale of The Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 540, 541 (1953). 
49. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§337, 338 (1976); N.Y. 
PENAL LAw, §§ 135.15, 135.30 (McKinney 1975). 
50. Law of March 4, 1949, ch. 4, §§ 385, 386, 1949 Md. Laws 7 (now codified as MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 337, 338 (1976». 
51. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43 (1851); People v. Marin, 48 Ill. 2d 205, 210, 269 
N.E.2d 303, 305 (1971); People v. Cohoon, 315 Ill. App. 259, 42 N.E.2d 969 (1942); 
Thompson v. State, 215 Ind. 129, 19 N.E.2d 165 (1939). 
52. See, e.g., People v. Marin, 48 Ill. 2d 205, 210, 269 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1971); Drury v. 
State, 253 Ind. 392, 395, 254 N.E.2d 335, 336 (1970); Guggenheimer v. Southern 
Seminary, Inc., 141 Va. 139, 145, 126 S.E. 72, 74 (1925). 
53. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw, ch. 2, § 7 (2d ed. 1969). As originally formulated, 
child-stealing consisted of the taking of an unmarried female under the age of 
sixteen from her parents. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 540, 551 (1953). Modem statutes, however, have broadened the 
offense to include any child regardless of sex. Id. at 552. 
54. E.g., COLO REv. STAT. § 18-3-302, 18-3-304 (1973) (under 18 years); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979) (under 14 years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 2, 2A 
(Supp. 1978) (under 12 years); N.Y. PENAL LAw, § 135.45 (McKinney 1975) (under 
16 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975) (under 14 years); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (1978) (under 16 years). Some statutes merely say any 
minor child. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 1979). 
55. Law of April 18, 1876, ch. 324, § 2, 1876 Md. Laws 557 (now codified as MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976». Prior to enactment of the 1978 Child Abduction Act, the 
Maryland Commission on Criminal Law indicated that the 1876 Child 
Abduction Act was applicable to parental child abduction cases. MARYLAND 
COMM'N ON CRIMINAL LAw, REPORT AND PART I OF THE PROPOSED CRIMINAL 
CODE 196 (1972). 
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right" language of the statute. Other state courts, however, have 
held that a parent ousted of custody by a court order has no right to 
take a child in violation of such order and cannot avail himself of a 
color of right defense in a child-stealing prosecution. 56 
In practice, however, this conduct has rarely been prosecuted.57 
One theory for the lack of prosecution is that the sanctions provided 
by child-stealing statutes have been generally too severe to warrant 
use against a parental offender. 58 For instance, Maryland's 1876 
Child Abduction Act carries a maximum sentence of twenty years 
imprisonment. 59 Mitigating factors, such as the affection motivating 
the natural parent and the absence of any physical threat of harm to 
the child, probably have resulted in the bypass of this criminal 
sanction in parental child abduction cases.60 The Maryland General 
Assembly reacted by creating a new misdemeanor offense, child 
abduction by a relative, which was enacted in 1978 [hereafter 
referred to as the 1978 Child Abduction Act].61 
III. MARYLAND'S CHILD ABDUCTION ACT OF 1978 
The 1978 Child Abduction Act provides as follows: 
A relative,62 who is aware that another person is a lawful 
custodian 63 of a child, may not: 
(1) abduct, take, or carry away a child under 12 years of 
age from the lawful custodian; 
56. See, e.g., Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 509--510, 127 P. 1023, 1024 (1912); State v. 
Farrar, 41 N.H. 53, 58 (1860); State v. Rhoades, 29 Wash. 61, 69, 69 P. 389, 390 
(1902). 
57. See Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1016 (1977) 
[hereafter cited as FOSTER & FREED]. 
58. [d. at 1016. 
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976). 
60. See generally Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10 WYo. L.J. 225, 226 
(1956). 
61. Law of May 16, 1978, ch. 435, 1978 Md. Laws 1581 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 2A (Supp. 1978)). 
62. ",(R]elative' means a parent, other ancestor, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt, or one 
who has at some prior time been a lawful custodian." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 2A(b) (Supp. 1978). 
63. "[L]awful custodian" means a person authorized, either alone or together 
with another person or persons, to have custody and exercise control 
over a child less than 12 years of age at the time and place of an act to 
which any provision of this section is, or may be alleged to be, 
applicable. The term shall include any person so authorized: 
(1) By an order of a court of competent jurisdiction of this State. 
(2) By an order of a court of competent jurisdiction of another state, 
territory, or the District of Columbia. However, when there has been a 
designation of a lawful custodian by an order of a court of this State and 
there appears to be a conflict between that order and a custody order 
issued by the court of another state or jurisdiction qualifying some other 
person as the custodian of the child, the "lawful custodian" is the person 
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(2) detain a child under 12 years of age away from the 
lawful custodian for more than 48 hours after return is 
demanded by the lawful custodian; 
(3) harbor or secrete a child under 12 years of age 
knowing that the physical custody of the child has been 
obtained or retained in violation of this section; or 
(4) act as an accessory to any of the actions forbidden in 
this section.64 
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Subsections (1), (3) and (4) prohibit a parent or relative from 
committing the same acts proscribed by the 1876 Child Abduction 
Act. 65 
A problem unique to the parental child-stealing case is created 
by the non-custodial parent's legal right to obtain temporary 
possession of the child as a result of exercising visitation privileges. 
The 1978 Child Abduction Act added subsection (2), which prohibits 
a subsequent detention for more than 48 hours after return is 
demanded by the lawful custodian. Presumably, the demand would 
be made following the expiration of the time allotted for visitation as 
set forth in the custody decree. 
Although a parent with visitation rights may be held criminally 
responsible for detaining a child after expiration of the visitation 
period (provided a return is demanded by the lawful custodian), a 
custodial parent who violates a custody decree by denying a parent's 
visitation rights is not subject to the new statute.66 The parties in 
appointed by order of a court of this State unless the order of the other 
state or jurisdiction: 
(i) Is later in date than the order of a court of this State; and 
(ii) Was issued in proceedings in which the person appointed by a 
custody order of a court of this State either consented to the custody 
order entered by the court of the other state or jurisdiction, or 
participated ther~in personally as a party. 
Id. at § 2A(a). 
In construing the word "person," the Maryland Annotated Code directs that 
it is to include a corporation, "unless such a construction would be unreasona-
ble." MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 15 (1976). See Wesbecker v. State, 240 Md. 41, 48, 
212 A.2d 737, 741 (1965). Therefore, the term "lawful custodian" should be 
construed broadly to include, for instance, state agencies, hospitals, or private 
agencies. C{. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(j) (Supp. 1978) 
("Custodian" means a person or agency to whom legal custody of a child has 
been given by order of the court, other than the child's parent or legal guardian.). 
This construction is reasonable given the power of the juvenile courts to issue 
shelter care orders, id. at § 3-815, order emergency medical treatment in 
appropriate circumstances, id. at § 3-822, and award custody to a public or 
private agency. Id. at § 3-820(b)(2). 
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c) (Supp. 1978). 
65. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
66. This result follows from the language of the 1978 Child Abduction Act, which 
prohibits the taking or detention of a child away from the "lawful custodian." 
See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra. "Lawful custodian" is defined by the 
statute as a person auth6rized to have "custody." See note 63 supra. The term 
"custody" connotes more than the mere right of "visitation." E.g., Trompeter v. 
Trompeter, 218 Kan. 535, 545 P.2d 297 (1975); McFadden v. McFadden, 206 Or. 
253, 261, 292 P.2d 795, 799 (1956). 
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these two situations obviously are not similarly situated, and the 
state's interest in preserving a stable environment for the child with 
the custodial parent may have caused the disparity in treatment. At 
least two jurisdictions, nevertheless, have provided criminal penal-
ties for the violation of a parent's visitation rights that are 
coextensive with the penalties for violating the custodial parent's 
right to custody.67 
In addition to adding a new prohibited act under subsection (2), 
the 1978 Child Abduction Act has changed the mens rea element of 
the child-stealing offense when a relative is involved. It relaxes the 
burden shouldered by the prosecution in cases involving parents or 
relatives by requiring only that the court find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the offender was "aware that another person is lawful 
custodian of [the] child" when the unlawful taking, detention, or 
harboring took place.6H Under the 1876 Child Abduction Act, 
however, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused had the intent to deprive the parent or lawful custodian 
of custody of the child.69 
The new mens rea element, however, does afford a relative or 
parent who is unaware of a court order designating another person 
as the lawful custodian a defense to any prosecution under the 1978 
Child Abduction Act. Court decisions are in conflict as to whether 
this defense is available under statutes similar to Maryland's 1876 
Child Abduction Act when a parent takes the child without reason to 
know that custody had been judicially awarded to another.70 
Two major changes have been wrought into Maryland's child-
stealing legislation by the 1978 Child Abduction Act. The first 
results by statutory construction. The second is by express provision. 
First, the 1978 Child Abduction Act will put theory to practice by 
removing parents and relatives from the severe criminal sanctions of 
the 1876 Child Abduction Act.7l An issue arises as to whether a 
relative is subject to both statutes because the particular enactment 
of 1978, which is limited to relatives, does not expressly remove 
relatives from the general enactment of 1876, which applies to any 
person. The answer is mandated by a well-settled rule of statutory 
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5(a) (West Supp. 1979) ("every person who has custody of 
a child pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of any court which grants 
another person rights to custody or visitation of such child, and who detains or 
conceals such child with the intent to deprive the other person of such right ... 
shall be punished" to the same degree as one who takes, retains or conceals the 
child from its lawful custodian in violation of a custody decree); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-303(2) (Supp. 1978) (a similar provision). 
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). 
69. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
70. E.g., State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594, 598, 264 P. 1069, 1071 (1928) (defense not 
allowed); Hicks v. State, 158 Tenn. 204, 12 S.W.2d 385 (1928) (defense allowed). 
71. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. 
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construction. When there is a particular enactment and a general 
enactment which would include what is embraced in the particular, 
the particular enactment is operative and is considered an exception 
to the general enactment.72 As applied to criminal statutes, "a 
subsequent statute impos[ing] a different penalty for the same, or 
practically the same, offense ... repeals the earlier [statute to the 
extent of any overlapping inconsistency]. . . whether the penalty is 
increased or diminished."73 The result is that the penalties for this 
conduct are substantially reduced where the offender is a parent or 
relative. Whereas a non-relative offender is subject to a felony 
conviction and a maximum sentence of twenty years,74 a parent or 
other relative found guilty of the same act is now subject to a 
misdemeanor conviction and a maximum penalty of thirty days in 
jail and a fifty dollar fine. 75 
The second major change is the provision that affords a 
"complete" defense to a parent or relative where the following 
conditions are met: (1) a petition is filed within 96 hours of the 
unlawful act with a Maryland equity courP6 explaining the 
circumstances and seeking a modification of the custody order;77 and 
(2) the defendant establishes in the criminal court that the action 
was taken to protect the child from a "clear and present danger" to 
its health, safety or welfare.78 The statute employs the nondescript 
term "complete" to designate the defense. The critical determination 
is whether it is a general or an affirmative defense which will then 
shift the burden of proof. 
A general defense denies an element of the offense. A parent 
who takes a child unaware that a court has judicially awarded 
custody to another has a general defense under the 1978 Child 
Abduction Act because the parent can assert that the mens rea 
element of the offense is missing. In such a case, the accused need 
merely corne forth with some evidence to controvert the prosecution's 
effort to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 79 
An affirmative defense, on the other hand, does not controvert 
an element of the offense but asserts that the accused is not 
criminally responsible because he has a legal excuse or justifi-
72. Maguire v. State, '192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949). 
73. State v. Gibson, 4 Md. App. 236, 247, 242 A.2d 575, 582, aff'd, 254 Md. 399, 254 
A.2d 691 (1968). See Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 158-59 (1854). 
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976). 
75. Id. § 2A(d) (Supp. 1978). 
76. Maryland provides its equity courts with exclusive jurisdiction to decide child 
custody matters. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1974). 
77. The modification petition should be filed pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, 
§ 186(a)(3)(ii) (1976). 
78. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(e) (Supp. 1978). 
79. See Bradford ~. State, 234 Md. 505, 514, 200 A.2d 150, 155 (1964). 
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cation.80 An affirmative defense requires the accused to establish its 
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.81 The "complete" 
defense of the 1978 Child Abduction Act does not controvert any 
element of the offense. It is, rather, in the nature of a justification 
and, therefore, it should be deemed an affirmative defense.82 As a 
result, a parent prosecuted under the 1978 Child Abduction Act 
should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defense is applicable. 
Another source of ambiguity in the 1978 Child Abduction Act is 
its "accessory" clause, which provides that "[a] relative ... may not 
. . . act as an accessory to any of the actions forbidden in this 
section."83 The clause is incongruous on its face. Although Maryland 
still recognizes the distinction between principals and accessories in 
felony cases,84 the state also follows the common law rule that all 
participants who would be classified as principals or accessories 
before the fact if the crime was felonious are classified as principals 
when the offense is a misdemeanor.85 To the extent the General 
Assembly intended to include any relative who aids or abets the 
commission of the act, whether or not present at the scene of the 
crime, the clause is, at best, redundant. They are all included as 
principals under the common law rule. 
The "accessory" clause, however, should not apply to any 
person, relative or non-relative, who receives, comforts or assists a 
perpetrator knowing that a violation of the 1978 Child Abduction 
Act has been committed. The Maryland Court of Appeals, following 
the common law,86 has defined an accessory after the fact as "one 
80.Id. 
81. Id. This shifting of the burden to the accused raises a constitutional question 
under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme 
Court has held that a state may shift the burden of proof in a criminal case from 
the state to the accused without violating the due process clause provided: 
(1) the state shall have proved enough to make it justfor the defendant 
to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, 
or (2) at least that upon a balancing of conveniences the shifting of the 
burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the 
accused to hardship or oppression. 
Morris v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934). See generally Note, Affirmative 
Defenses Under New York's New Penal Law, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44, 47-48 
(1968). 
82. C{. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975) (designates the same defense an 
affirmative defense). 
83. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c)(4) (Supp. 1978). 
84. Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. 278, 280, 234 A.2d 284, 286 (1967). A principal is one 
who commits a crime as a perpetrating actor or one who aids or abets the 
commission of the crime while actually or constructively present at the scene of 
the crime. Id. An accessory before the fact procures, counsels or commands 
another in the commission of the crime but is not actually or constructively pres-
ent at the scene of the crime. Id. 
85. See Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955); Broadway v. 
State, 23 Md. App. 68, 78, 326 A.2d 212, 218 (1974). 
86. See J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 77 (1934). 
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who, knowing that a felony has been committed, harbors and 
protects the felon or renders him any other assistance to elude 
punishment."87 The critical element is that a felony must have been 
committed. There is no common law penalty for comforting or 
aiding a misdemeanant after the crime.88 The Maryland Court of 
Appeals has further proclaimed that the "technical [definition of an 
accessory after the fact is] too fundamental in the common law of 
crime to be overcome by juridical reasoning."89 The ambiguous 
insertion of the "accessory" clause in the 1978 Child Abduction Act 
should not serve to overcome the common law rule by implication90 
because the Maryland Constitution requires the General Assembly 
to do so expressly.91 To accomplish the purpose of including those 
who would be classified as accessories after the fact if the crime were 
a felony, the statute should require language expressly providing for 
one who harbors, protects or renders any other assistance for the 
purpose of eluding punishment to any relative who has violated any 
section of the Act. 
Notwithstanding the qualified nature of the "accessory" clause 
which apparently limits its application to relatives, a non-relative 
participant should be subject to the same sanctions. The general rule 
is that an aider or abettor is criminally responsible only for those 
crimes committed by the perpetrator wliich are the natural or 
probable consequence of the crime that was counseled, commanded, 
aided or abetted.92 If the perpetrator is a parent or other relative, any 
relative or non-relative assisting in the commission of the act is 
criminally liable as a principal in the misdemeanor offense.93 
If a parent or relative, however, is an accessory to a felonious 
taking by a non-relative, the 1978 Child Abduction Act will not 
protect the parent or relative from a felony conviction.94 An unlawful 
taking by a non-relative with the intent to deprive the lawful 
custodian of custody, or an accessory to that act, remains subject to 
the sanctions provided by the 1876 Child Abduction Act.95 
The net result of the 1978 Child Abduction Act is to limit the 
sanction for the unlawful taking or detention of a child under twelve 
by a parent or other relative to a misdemeanor conviction. Any 
87. Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217-18, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955). 
88. Id. at 217, 117 A.2d at 552. 
89. Id. at 218-19, 117 A.2d at 552. 
90. Cf, Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. 278, 281-82, 234 A.2d 284, 287 (1967) (The 
. Maryland Court of Appeals is very cautious in interpreting statutes so as not to 
give them any greater effect than possible in abrogating the common law rules.). 
91. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5. 
92. See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 55 Iowa 321, 7 N.W. 583 (1880); State v. Craft, 338 Mo. 
831, 92 S.W.2d 626, 630 (1936); Watts v. State, 5 W. Va. 532, 536 (1872). 
93. See text accompanying note 85 supra. 
94. The accessory clause is limited "to any of the actions forbidden" by the 1978 
Child Abduction Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c)(4). If the perpetrator is a 
non-relative, the 1876 Child Abduction Act applies. Id. § 2 (1976). 
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976). 
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person, relative or non-relative, who assists in the commission of the 
act should be subject to the same limited sanctions. A non-relative 
who unlawfully takes a child under twelve years of age is subject to 
the felony sanctions provided by the 1876 Child Abduction Act or 
Maryland's kidnapping statutes.96 If the child is twelve or older, the 
kidnapping statutes alone apply. A relative who is an accessory to 
one of these felonious takings should be subject to the same felony 
sanctions. In no case, however, is a parent guilty of kidnapping.97 If 
a parent unlawfully takes a child twelve or older, the prosecution is 
limited to the common law offense of false imprisonmentYM 
IV. REMAINING PROBLEMS 
Maryland's 1978 Child Abduction Act is limited to an unlawful 
taking in violation of a child custody order.99 The statute does not 
apply when a parent, sensing an unfavorable resolution of the 
custody issue, removes the child to another state before a custody 
decree is rendered. In Maryland, both parents have an equal right to 
custody of the childHlO so that either may legally take the child until 
a court order altering custody is issued. In addition, a custody order 
obtained after the parent has left the state with the child should not 
create criminal liability on the part of the out-of-state parent even 
when a demand for the child has been made. 101 Use of the statute to 
hold the out-of-state patent criminally responsible for the mere 
detention of the child in another state in violation of the custody 
decree would constitute an invalid exercise of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction.102 
The Texas legislature has uniquely provided for the situation in 
which a child is removed to another state after a custody proceeding 
is instituted but prior to the time the court issues its decree. The 
Texas statute not only prohibits a taking or detention in violation of 
a child custody award, but also provides a sanction for the taking of 
a child to defeat the court's jurisdiction when a person "has not been 
awarded custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction 
and knows that a suit for divorce, or a civil suit or application for 
habeas corpus to dispose of the child's custody, has been filed." 10:1 
96. Id. §§ 2, 337, 338. 
97. See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra. 
98. Normally, the detention or carrying away of a person is not unlawful if it is with 
the consent of the person taken. See text accompanying note 51 supra. In the 
case of a minor, however, courts have held that a detention or carrying away of 
the child is, as a matter of law, without the consent of the child when it occurs 
without the consent of the lawful custodian, regardless of any evidence to the 
contrary. See State v. Farrar, 41 N.H. 53, 59 (1860) (seminal case). 
99. See the definition of "lawful custodian" at note 63 supra. 
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1976). 
101. See State v. McCormick, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3005 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
102. Id. 
103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 25.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974). 
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The Maryland General Assembly may be called upon eventually to 
incorporate a similar provision into its legislation. 
Another question is whether the misdemeanor penalty provided 
by the 1978 Child Abduction Act will cause state governors, who at 
times have been reluctant to extradite persons for misdemeanor 
offenses,104 to refuse to extradite parental kidnappers in these cases. 
Some states, aware of the extradition problem, have made parental 
child-stealing a felony.105 
A more important question is whether states will be able to 
effectively locate the abducted children. Commentators and federal 
legislators are arguing that federal legislation is needed to assist the 
states in this endeavor.106 Solutions proposed include amending the 
federal kidnapping statute to impose federal criminal sanctions for 
parental kidnapping.107 One argument in support of the federal 
criminalization approach to the problem is that it would confer clear 
authority for FBI investigation, thus facilitating the location of 
abducted children. lOS 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the passage of the 1978 Child Abduction Act, Maryland 
has taken a second legislative step to deter parental child 
abductions. Problems, however, still remain. In particular, the 
ability of local police forces to locate abducted children without 
federal assistance is still a critical question. 109 The case supporting 
the General Assembly's response is patent; the real question IS 
whether it is enough. 
Allan L. Martin 
104. See, e.g., State v. McCormick, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3005, 3006 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 
1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 note (Page 1975); FOSTER & FREED, supra 
note 57, at 1018. 
105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 note (Page 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 25.03 note (Vernon 1974). See COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-304 (1973); KAN. STAT. 
§ 21-3422a (Supp. 1978); WYo. STAT. § 6-4-204 (1977). But see [1979] 5 FAM. L. 
REP. (BNA) 1059 (felonization rejected in Virginia). 
106. See Coombs, The "Snatched" Child Is Halfway Home In Congress, 11 FAM. L.Q. 
407 (1978); FOSTER & FREED, supra note 57, at 1017. 
107. The federal kidnapping statute now excludes parents from its ambit. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(a) (1952). 
108. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 57, at 1017. 
109. Cf, Zielenziger, Paternal Kidnapping Leaves Kids Wondering Why Mom and 
Dad Can't Behave, The Baltimore Sun, Dec. 20, 1978, § B (Home), at 1, col. 1 
(mother of abducted children had to wait for a fortuitous parking violation by 
abducting father in Alabama before aducted children who had traveled through 
various states could be located and returned to mother in Maryland). 
